BORDER STATES: CALIFORNIA, TEXAS, AND RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

Los impactos del TLCAN en la economía regional, el crecimiento económico y la integración México-Estados Unidos,

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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed and ratified in 1993, and on January 1, 1994, it took effect. Along the border, there was a flurry of activity as state and local chambers of commerce, business groups, and public officials, began to prepare for a more open Mexican economy. On the U.S. side, fears of competition from relatively low Mexican wages were offset by the anticipation of export and outsourcing opportunities, particularly in Texas and California, the two most populous states and the two with the largest quantity of exports going to Mexico.

Commerce aside, however, not all was well in the border states. At the start of 1994, Californians were still worried about the effects of a national recession that lingered in the state for several years after it ended most of the rest of the country. The lengthy recession caused large state budget deficits, which, in turn, prompted an angry public debate over the relationship of the deficits to the costs of providing schools, health care, and other social services to immigrants. Ultimately, an opportunistic governor was able to split the electorate and ride a wave of anti-immigration feeling to re-election in a vote that was widely viewed as anti-Mexico.

In the same year, Texas governor-elect George Bush gave a number of speeches tying the state's economic future to Mexico and explicitly rejecting California's immigrant bashing (Hall, 1994a). Throughout the state, Texans signed up for classes "sponsored by community colleges, chambers of commerce and government agencies, to help…turn themselves into Mexicans" (*New York Times,* 1994). Media exaggeration perhaps, but along the border, local symbols and politics displayed a similar pattern. In the Gulf Coast city of Brownsville, legal arguments were made on behalf of the city to appropriate the official designation as 'NAFTA Home Port' (Hall, 1994b), while the

Pacific Coast city of San Diego rejected the idea of a binational, joint usage, border-airport with its neighbor, Tijuana.

1. What lies beneath the differences?

California and Texas are the two most populous states in the nation, they both share a border with Mexico, and they both have significant Mexican American minorities. Both were Spanish colonies and part of Mexico's empire after its independence. Their place names, colonial architecture, cuisine, and literature, all reflect Latino, specifically Mexican, influence. The question naturally arises as to how one state could be perceived as anti-Mexico, while the other ties its future to collaboration with Mexico. To some extent, these perceptions are media creations, but beneath the marketing and public relations are some fundamental demographic and economic realities that shape state policy and, as a consequence, have significant implications for border communities and their citizens. Border populations and state-level economic incentives are critical to understanding differences in the political responses of communities to cross border relations, since these two variable interact in ways that create both doors and walls between U.S. border communities and their counterparts in Mexico.

State policies shapes border relations

Differences in state policies towards Mexico are paralleled by the differences in border community relations. For example, the study by Rodriguez and Hagan (2001) focuses on Laredo-Nuevo Laredo and El Paso-Ciudad Juárez, where they find an extensive network of cross-border relations. Among the examples cited are joint urban planning (Urban Plan of Los Dos Laredos), joint environmental planning, guides to the cities' histories, shared construction of international bridges, joint training of nurses and

public safety officials, and many others. In addition, Texas state policy offers in-state tuition to Mexican citizens attending state universities located on the border, and in communities like El Paso, Laredo, and Brownsville, this is a powerful draw for students from Mexico.

California, by way of contrast, has essentially two border communities, San Diego and Imperial counties. San Diego county, which is comprised of the city of San Diego and 17 additional city jurisdictions, is the largest metropolitan area in the border region and, judging by the origins of its population, the most cosmopolitan of border regions. By way of contrast, Imperial county is a mixture of suburbs and agricultural fields, and is located across the border from the much larger urban area of Mexicali, Baja California. Cross border relations are very different in the two California communities, and although San Diego offers numerous examples of collaboration in higher education, civic organizations, and local public administration (e.g., public safety, health care, fire protection services), cross-border community relations in general are much less developed. One recent study (Del Castillo, 2001) offers a pessimistic view in which cross-border problems remain unaddressed until they become unavoidable, but also much more intractable and difficult to resolve.

Between California on the western border and Texas in the east, Arizona and New Mexico fill intermediate roles. Their relatively smaller populations, and the fact that their borders span the Sonoran and Chihuahuan deserts, make them less visible in United States-Mexico relations. Nevertheless, Arizona's location next to the important agricultural states of Sonora and Sinaloa, has created significant incentives to cultivate closer ties with Mexico and to capture a larger share of the transportation and trade jobs

that are generated by Mexico's exports of vegetables, beef, and other agricultural products. Even New Mexico, which has the least amount of cross border trade, both in absolute terms and relative to its total trade, has invested in border crossing infrastructure in order to capture some of the congestion that is spilling out of the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez metroplex.

State policies toward Mexico are not rooted in history

One assumption that we make is that the Latino origin populations in U.S. border cities and states are central to relations with Mexico. That is, a population that speaks Spanish and identifies itself with Mexican culture, is critical to cross border relations, even if the degree of identification is less than complete. In that case, it is useful to look at the size of the Latino population and its settlement patterns.

In 1850, Mexican Americans, or Tejanos, made up only about 7% (14,000) of the population of Texas (Jordan, 1984 p. 83). Texas was a "failed frontier" in the eyes of Spain and Mexico and both nations had trouble attracting settlers. There was no gold or silver, and no great Native American civilizations. By comparison, on the eve of the gold rush, California's population is estimated to have had about 15,000 people total, exclusive of Native Americans, with about one-half that total (7,000) considered Californians (i.e., Mexican citizens; Wright, 1940). According to Wright, "…California displayed a culture predominantly Hispanic-American; the language was Spanish, the religion Roman Catholic…." The gold rush changed everything in California, and although the first miners came from Sonora, the tidal wave of humanity that swept over the gold fields quickly changed the state into a cosmopolitan frontier, but one with a predominantly Anglo culture. The gold fields quickly became inhospitable to foreigners,

and although Spanish remained important to the daily life of many Californians (e.g., the state constitution was drafted in both Spanish and English) the Californios were pushed aside, at first by the new immigrants and then by the legal challenges to their landholdings.[1]

Texas Latinos, or Tejanos, were not overcome by a tidal wave of immigration as were Californios, but they were subject to the same ethnic and political pressures, including the denial of property rights that confronted Mexican Americans in the 19th and 20th centuries. In other words, the idea that Anglo-Mexican relations are more harmonious in Texas than in California is relatively new. Martinez (1988, pp. 82-84), for example, chronicles a long list of conflicts, and Larralde and Jacobo's discussion of Juan Cortina and the Cortinista rebellion assert that "…Texas law practically encouraged intimidation and dispossession of the Mexicans" (Larralde and Jacobo, 2000, p. 27).

Table 1 shows the Latino origin population from 1940, when the Census Bureau began to measure it, to the recent census in 2000. As shown, differences between California and Texas in the size of their Latino populations are not very great, and as of 2000, they have disappeared altogether. This fact argues against the idea that border relations in Texas are better because the state-population of Latinos is larger, or that it has been significantly larger throughout history.

[Table 1]

Location, ethnicity, and language

[1] Sandos (2001) gives a brief description of the fate of the residents of the state at the time of the gold rush. While the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo recognized the land rights of Mexican land grants, the need to prove title and to determine precise boundaries drove many into bankruptcy. What the courts began, droughts and floods in the 1860s finished.

If the size of the Latino population does not seem to carry a lot of explanatory power, its location may. Several scholars have noted the concentration of Tejanos along the border region and have tried to classify the area as a distinct cultural region. For example, Arreola (2001) identifies at least seven cultural regionalizations of south Texas Latinos in the scholarly literature between 1948 and 1984. Jordan's (1984) "Hispanic Borderland" seems the most comprehensive description of a swath of counties on the southern border of Texas. Quantitative analysis supports the idea of a relatively concentrated Latino population. For example, the ten percent of Texas counties with the greatest Latino population have a larger share of the total Latino population (81 percent) than the equivalent set of California counties (71 percent).[2] Similarly, other measures of concentration are consistent with this analysis.[3] In sum, there are no significant differences in the size of each state's share of Latino origin populations, but there is both qualitative and quantitative evidence that the population is more concentrated in Texas than it is in California.

Two related points are that the Texas border counties are nearly all majority Latino counties, often by an overwhelming amount, and that Spanish is the primary language of a majority of Texas border residents in all but two rural counties (Jeff Davis and Kinney). Even New Mexico cannot rival the Texas border in its use of Spanish as the primary language. In a number of cases (Cameron, Hidalgo, Maverick, Starr, Webb, Zapata), counties approach mono-cultural status with the proportion of the population that is Latino over 80 percent. In addition, these are some of the most urban counties, with cities such as Laredo, Mcallen, and Brownsville falling within their boundaries. The

[2] This is based on data from the 1990 census.

importance of shared ethnicity and language cannot be overestimated as explanations for the perception of relatively deeper border integration among the communities that share the Río Grande as a common divide between the two nations.

In a practical and obvious way, ethnicity and language can facilitate communication, making cross-border cooperation easier between local public authorities, civic groups, and ordinary citizens. In addition, they represent a greater likelihood that cultural assumptions and historical points of references are shared across the border as well. For example, Canada's standing as the closest U.S. ally and trading partner is partly due to its location but also to its history and language. Similarly, observers of the European Union's progress have noted the advantage to integration that accrues after one or two generations of bureaucrats have worked in a multilateral environment where they have been able to develop language skills and social and professional networks across the Union.

Mexican Americans fulfill a key function in local, cross border relations. Their cross border networks of family, social, and professional ties facilitate understanding, cooperation, and the construction of public and private networks. Writing about cross-border collaboration in Laredo/Nuevo Laredo and El Paso/Ciudad Juárez, Rodriguez and Hagan (2001, p.107) comment that "…it was clear that persons saw their inter-city solidarity to be a product of local relational styles and local problem-solving approaches, owing nothing to formal, federal, agreements between the United States and Mexico. Especially in Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, many respondents commented that the high level of

[3] For example the Gini coefficient for concentration of the Latino population (share of population relative to share of Latinos) is 0.298 in Texas and 0.195 in California, again using the 1990 census.

transborder relations between their two cities was, for the most part, based on informal relations and interpersonal contacts."

2. Political representation

Ethnic identity impacts politics in direct ways. In the case of the Texas border counties, the larger concentration of Latino or Hispanic population leads to more elected officials of the same ethnicity. According to the *2002 National Directory of Latino Elected Officials,* Texas accounted for 1,965 (44.0 percent) of the 4,464 Latino elected officials in the United States. The figure includes federal and state office holders, as well as county and municipal officials, elected judicial and law enforcement officials, school board and other elected education officials, and special district officials, such as those for hospital or irrigation districts. Given that Texas has over four times as many counties as California, the presence of more local governments implies that there are greater opportunities to hold office. Nevertheless, the shares of the total population that are Latino are nearly identical in Texas and California, yet the former has more than twice as many Latino elected officials (1,965 compared to 904 in California).

[Table 3]

Table 3 shows that in the four U.S. border states, the variation in the number of Latino elected officials is much greater in the border region than it is at the state level, particularly if population weights are used. On a per capita basis and at the state level, data range from 3,106 persons per Latino elected official (New Mexico) to 39,611 (California). In the border regions, however, the range is 2,808 (Texas) to 45,584 (California). Note that in the case of Texas, approximately 38 percent of its Latino elected officials are in the border, where less than 10 percent of the total population is

located. By contrast, California has less than 8 percent of its Latino elected officials in the border, where just under 9 percent of the total population lives. Once again, the location of the Latino population is important in explaining patterns. The relatively higher concentration of Latinos in the Texas borderlands, and their relatively greater diffusion throughout California, determine that political representation by Latino elected officials is much greater in the Texas border regions than it is in either the rest of Texas, or in California.

Taken together, Tables 3 and 2 support the hypothesis that border relations in Texas are likely to encounter fewer difficulties based on language, ethnicity, or a lack of understanding of the cultural contexts of decisions and values. Local elected officials in the border region must still learn the institutional structure of the other side, and speaking the same language does not guarantee that they will. Nevertheless, the cultural distances between local elected officials in the border region of Texas are much less than the distances that must be traveled by officials in San Diego or Tucson. For this reason alone, it should not be surprising if there is greater cross-border collaboration on the eastern end of the border than exists on the western end. What would be very surprising, is if there were the same or less cross-border collaboration and understanding.

3. Economics matters

Texas needs Mexico. State leaders have not always realized this fact, and during boom periods, when oil prices or cotton production was high, the proximity of a large developing country did not seem to offer any particular advantage. Periods of crisis, however, are another story. Mexico was useful as a place to ship out cotton and bring in

armaments during the Civil War, but it took the oil price collapse of 1982 to start the state down its current path.

Figure 1 shows personal state income in Texas and California, 1970 to 2002, relative to average U.S. personal income. A value of 100 indicates that state income is equal to the national average. Figure 1 is divided into three periods, beginning with (1), the oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s. During this period, per capita incomes in Texas were rising relative to the U.S. average, while in California, there was no trend up or down. This was followed by (2), the collapse in oil prices and the resulting economic adjustment, which was coincident with the "Lost Decade" of development in Latin America. The collapse of the oil market, together with tough, anti-inflation, policies at the national level, rippled through the Texas economy, causing a collapse in the real estate market, declines in construction and the financial sectors, and a major recession and restructuring. California too was affected by the national recession, but its level of average income began a much more gentle decline towards the national average. The period of relative decline in Texas lasted until 1989, by which time its average per capita income was less than 90 percent of the national level.

[Figure 1]

The third period began around 1990, when a long period of expansion began, in spite of a relatively mild national recession in 1991. In Texas, this was a period slow convergence towards the national average, until 1998, when a mild relative decline began. In California, the third period was more serious, as the mild national recession of 1991 turned into a steep decline at the state level. By 1996-97, the state economy began

to recover, but the period of relative decline left a scar which showed up in various anti-immigrant measures.[4]

In the middle of the 1980s, when Mexico began to address its own crisis, a new market opened on Texas's southern border.[5] The country's shift from an inward to an outward orientation had a two-fold benefit for the state of Texas. On the one hand, Texas is located on the main trade corridor between Mexico and U.S. manufacturing centers, and most overland trade between the two nations flows through Laredo or another port of entry in Texas. Consequently, transportation and allied trade services are an unusually large share of the state economy and as trade with Mexico grew, the associated economic activities expanded. Between 1990 and 1999, the state experienced a growth rate in transportation services was nearly 75 percent greater than the expansion of the same sector nationally, while state wholesale trade grew about 46 percent more than its national counterpart (Gerber, 2002, p151). A second advantage was that Texas benefited from the spillover of manufacturing into its economy. As northern industrial cities such as Monterrey, Matamoros, Saltillo, Reynosa, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Juárez, expanded production, the manufacturing sector in Texas grew along with it. Although a few manufacturing sectors in Texas may have gotten smaller (for example, apparel manufacturing in El Paso) total manufacturing employment and production grew dramatically, as evidenced by the fact that in 1990s, while the United States lost 630,000 manufacturing jobs, the state of Texas gained 109,848 jobs (Gerber, 2002).

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[4] The state used the direct initiative process to pass Proposition 187 which denied social services to undocumented immigrants, Proposition 209 which ended affirmative action, and Proposition 227 to end bilingual education in public schools. Proposition 187, the most objectionable, was determined to be unconstitutional and was never implemented.

[5] Mexico jointed GATT in 1986 and both President de La Madrid (1982-1988) and President Salinas (1988-1994) emphasized open markets, international trade, and deeper economic relations with the United States.

Job growth in Texas was fueled by several factors, including the unilateral lowering of trade barriers in Mexico with its entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.[6] In 1987, manufacturing jobs began to expand in Texas, and between that date and 1999, Texas added 166,000 manufacturing jobs (Gerber, 2002). Many of the jobs were related to the growth in Mexican manufacturing on the border, which is discussed more fully in the next chapter. Note, however, that three of the five cities that collectively contain more than 50 percent of the firms and workers in U.S.-origin Mexican maquiladora firms, are directly on the border with Texas (Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, and Reynosa; see Solunet, 2001).[7] Empirical analysis by Hanson (1996, 1997), shows that the growth in manufacturing in the border maquiladora has had a positive impact on manufacturing employment in the adjacent U.S. border cities.

Other factors contributed to job growth in Texas manufacturing in the 1990s. The rapid increase in oil prices during the 1970s enabled the state to focus on the development of a high-technology sector, particularly in central Texas around the campus of the University of Texas in Austin. UT Austin was able to play a similar role to the one played by Stanford University in building Silicon Valley, where land, industrial park infrastructure, and public-private partnerships, came together to foster a growing information technology sector. Throughout the 1970s, there was a stream of high technology firms that grew-up or moved to the Austin area, including Motorola, Texas Instruments, Lockheed, and Advanced Micro Devices. The migration continued through

[6] GATT is an agreement on tariffs that remains in force. With the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the agreement came under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which began life in 1995.

the 1980s with the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), 3M, and, in 1988, the important new private-public joint venture, Sematech (Whitnew, 1988).[8] When the U.S. economy expanded in the 1990s, the strong base of high-technology electronics manufacturing was ready to grow as well.

Not all of the expansion in Texas' manufacturing throughout the 1990s was in high technology, however. In addition to electronic equipment, instruments, and industrial machinery, several relatively low-technology sectors experienced rapid growth. Among these were the building materials sector, leather products, and lumber and wood products. Building materials and lumber and wood products responded to the construction boom which is fueled by the national movement of population towards the sun-belt.

Trade dependency

Given its location close to Mexico's most industrial northern city, Monterey, and also given that it is the midpoint on a line between central Mexico and the U.S. industrial heartland, foreign trade originating in Texas is concentrated on Mexico. Table 4 shows the trade pattern for all U.S. border states. In 2002, 46 percent of the exports originating in Texas went to Mexico (United States International Trade Administration, 2004).[9]

Texas is the number one state-trader with Mexico. In dollar terms, its Mexican trade is more than 2.7 times greater than exports from California, the number two state-trader. This is a remarkable concentration of trade, particularly when it is realized that

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[7] Maquiladora are export oriented firms that operate under a special Mexican tax provision. Most of them are U.S. owned, and they are concentrated in electronics, autoparts, and to a lesser degree, apparel.
[8] The latter is a consortium that began with 14 of the leading U.S. based semiconductor firms, and is half-funded by the U.S. government. Its mission was to regain and maintain U.S. leadership in semiconductor design and manufacturing (Tyson, 1992).
[9] This figure is based on the Export Locator series which tries to trace the origin of exports.

Mexico is a developing country. Although it is not uncommon for developing countries to export the bulk of their goods to a high income country, it is rare for the reverse to occur. In general, developing countries are unable to absorb a large share of the output of rich states or countries, and the latter have a wide variety of developed country markets they can sell their goods to. In part, trade between Texas and Mexico is based on the state's strategic location, but it is also partly due to the growth of manufacturing along Mexico's northern border. Computers and electronic products, transportation equipment, and electrical equipment, appliances and parts, made up 49 percent of state exports to Mexico in 2000 (International Trade Administration, 2004). While precise numbers are unknown, a large share of this trade is intra-firm or intra-industry, between plants in Texas and Mexico. Growth in the maquiladora industry has supported the development of this trade, and has enabled firms to remain competitive through the use of plants in Mexico.

California, too, is located next to Mexico, and the increasingly important industrial centers of Tijuana and Mexicali. However, this is the southwest corner of the United States and the northwest corner of Mexico. From California's perspective, it is more important that it is located on the Pacific Rim, and since the time it became a state, California's trade with Australia, Japan, China, and other population centers across the Pacific have figured more prominently in the state's economy than its trade with Mexico. Recent growth in California-Mexico trade, together with Japan's stagnant economy during the 1990s, has begun to alter this, but it remains more concentrated on Asia than on Latin America. Consequently, the regional and global economic integration that occurred through the 1980s and 1990s had different meanings for California and Texas.

In the former, markets in East Asia took on a greater role, while in the latter, trade with Mexico became dominant. Because of this difference in the orientations of their economies, it is not difficult to understand why governors in Texas cultivate relations with Mexico, while California's leadership tends to look west, across the Pacific Ocean.

Economic distance

Discussions of Mexico-U.S. border relations usually frame the issue in terms of the asymmetry of political power and differences in culture. These are important dimensions, but they are often confused with obstacles to cross-border collaboration stemming from the asymmetry of economic development. That is, economic distance caused by differences in the level of economic development can pose serious obstacles to cross-border collaboration. The specific effects of economic distance is difficult to quantify, but it must include a higher degree of mistrust and lack of confidence in cross border partners. This can run in both directions since poorer regions may experience a sense of exploitation by their richer counterparts across the border, while the latter focus on the lack of enforcement of rules and regulations, corruption, and a lack of transparency in the design of systems and policies. Pappademetriou and Meyers (2001) show that border dwellers around the world worry about corruption, rule transparency, and follow through on commitments by their counterparts on the other side. While many of these concerns have a cultural or linguistic element, there is often an economic one as well. For example, the perception of order within an urban landscape is partly a cultural phenomenon related to architecture and the built environment of roads, parks, sidewalks and other constructed elements. The perception of order is also economic, since less

well-off cities have less to spend on graffiti and litter removal, delivery of clean water, paving of roads and other urban amenities.

[Table 5]

Table 5 illustrates the degree of economic distance between border counties and municipios, grouped together by state. All values are per person, Mexican values are converted to U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity exchange rates which take into account the differences in prices.[10] The most striking feature of Table 5 is the west to east gradient in border incomes (GDP per person) in the United States.[11] Whether using a simple average of the U.S. border counties within each state, or a population weighted average of county income per capita, the western side of the border is better off. Perhaps most striking, is the relatively smooth decline in incomes from west to east. The California border is the richest border region, and even though Baja California is a relatively prosperous Mexican region, the ratio is around 3 to 1. Moving east, the U.S. side of the border becomes progressively poorer, and the ratio of incomes falls to around 1.5 to 1 by the time one reaches Texas.

This analysis does not prove anything about border relations, but it does suggest that even if we set aside cultural issues such as language and ethnicity, the residents of the Texas border have much less economic difference between themselves and their counterparts in Mexico, than do residents of California (particularly San Diego) or Arizona. The number represent averages, with the usual caveat that if they are relatively accurate estimates, there is still a great deal of variation. Nevertheless, they confirm

[10] Purchasing power parity exchange rates take into account price differences. For example, the $9500 in per capita GDP in the border municipios of Tamalupias means that an average income in those border municipios will buy a basket of goods and services that would cost $9500 in the United States.

general impressions of the border that colonias in Texas are not that different from many places across the Río Grande in Mexico.

4. Conclusion

In their recent collection of essays on borders around the world, Papademetriou and Meyers (2001) conclude that it is common for border communities to influence border conditions and national border policies. The key, however, is that they must first know what they want. What this chapter shows is that communities in California and Baja California will have a more difficult time developing mutual understanding and agreement on a common future. Collaboration on the western end of the border comes up against numerous barriers, in the form of cultural, linguistic, economic, and administrative differences between border cities. These barriers make it less likely that Californians and Baja Californians can reach agreement about the operation of the border and the many ways it inserts itself into the lives of both communities. In the case of Texas, however, the story is different. All of the factors that interfere with collaboration in California are sources of strength in Texas, and state planners increasingly recognize this.

[11] Table 5 uses the county and municipio equivalent of gross domestic product per person. This is a measure of the total value of all goods and services produced during a year.

Table 1
Hispanic Origin Population, percents

	California	*Texas*
1940	6.0	11.5
1970	13.7	17.7
2000	32.4	32.0

Source: Gibson and Jung (2002)

Table 2
Language and Ethnicity on the United States-Mexico Border

	Percent of Total Population Hispanic or Latino	*Percent of Population over 5 That Speaks Spanish at Home*
United States	**12.5**	**10.7**
California	**32.4**	**25.8**
Imperial	72.2	65.3
San Diego	26.7	21.9
Arizona	**25.3**	**19.5**
Cochise	30.7	25.2
Pima	29.3	22.8
Santa Cruz	80.8	79.5
Yuma	50.5	43.5
New Mexico	**42.1**	**28.7**
Dona Ana	63.4	52.6
Grant	48.8	35.6
Hidalgo	56.0	43.3
Luna	57.7	48.7
Texas	**32.0**	**27.0**
Brewster	43.6	41.0
Cameron	84.3	78.3
Culberson	72.2	72.1
Dimmit	85.0	76.0
El Paso	78.2	71.2
Hidalgo	88.3	82.3
Hudspeth	75.0	73.9
Jeff Davis	35.5	36.0
Kinney	50.5	45.9
Maverick	95.0	90.6
Presidio	84.4	83.9
Starr	97.5	90.4
Terrell	48.6	52.4
Val Verde	75.5	59.1
Webb	94.3	91.3
Zapata	84.8	78.1

Source: Census Bureau (2000a)

Table 3
Latino Elected Officials, 2001

	California	*Arizona*	*New Mexico*	*Texas*
Population				
State	34,501,130	5,307,331	1,829,146	21,325,018
Border	3,008,563	1,186,862	258,471	2,024,798
Latino Elected Officials				
State	871	304	589	1,923
Border	66	67	60	721
Population per Latino Elected Official				
State	39,611	17,458	3,106	11,089
Border	45,584	17,714	4,308	2,808

Source: NALEO (2002), US Census Bureau (2004).

*City, county, and special districts, including elected members of the judiciary; does not include state and federal office holders.

Figure 1: Percent of Average U.S. Percapita Personal Income, 1970-2002



Table 4
Trade patterns of border states, 2000

	California	*Arizona*	*New Mexico*	*Texas*
Total trade with world, (millions)	119,640	14,334	2,391	103,866
Trade with Mexico (millions)	17,515	4,651	127	47,761
Percent of state trade with Mexico	14.6	32.4	5.3	46.0
No. 1 trade partner	Mexico	Mexico	Korea	Mexico

Source: United States International Trade Administration (2004); United States Census Bureau (2004).

Table 5
Estimated average GDP per person in border counties and municipios, 2000
(U.S. dollars, PPP basis)

Border counties and municipios	*Population*	*GDP per person, unweighted**	*GDP per person, weighted**
California	2,956,194	26,820	32,971
Arizona	1,159,908	22,138	25,535
New Mexico	236,632	18,714	19,115
Texas	1,974,765	16,373	16,879
Baja California	2,045,302	10,956	11,533
Sonora	514,876	8,834	10,033
Chihuahua	1,249,216	9,454	12,196
Coahuila	277,071	10,204	12,117
Nuevo Leon	18,474	10,305	10,305
Tamulipas	1,340,811	8,446	9,350

*Purchasing power parity estimates for an average of each state's border counties and municipios, with and without population weights.

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